Quote from: AkrasiaDude, time to recognise that people who have read Habermas might not agree with your take on his work.  (For what it is worth, I have not only read Habermas, but my MPhil thesis at Oxford was partially on Habermas's 'discourse ethics'.  A thesis that was recognised as 'the best in political theory' the year that it was examined, by G.A. Cohen, Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at All Souls College.  Sure that was well over 10 years ago, and I've since not been focused on Habermas's stuff, but your claim that I haven't read him or thought critically about his views is completely false.)

Well, my apologies then if you have read some Habermas. But since Habermas' political views aren't at issue here, it's not very relevant. We're talking about whether his distinction between aesthetic and moral judgments is well-founded in his philosophical works or not.

QuoteYou mean like Justification and Application, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, and Between Facts and Norms?  Sorry to disappoint you, but having looked at 'his actual philosophical approach' in those works, I find your own spin on his views implausible.

I'm unfamiliar with MCCA, but Between Facts and Norms, and J&A both deal with discourse ethics, not with the legitimacy of the distinction between aesthetics and morals.

We're talking about whether his distinction between aesthetic and moral judgements holds in his philosophy. The only work I'm aware of that he treats the issue in any great depth is Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. I therefore think it is the work we should look to for an answer to that question.

I'm curious as to what exactly your grounds are for finding my position implausible then?

QuoteLook, you like his very early work rather than his most recent stuff.  Fine, good for you.  But that doesn't mean that someone who has read his more recent stuff, and understands him to be advancing a broadly Kantian moral and political philosophy, hasn't 'critically engaged' with his work.

I didn't say that they weren't. I think you would be well-served by re-reading the history of this conversation. You asked me on what basis I grounded my use of Habermas as a critic of Kant's distinction between moral and aesthetic judgements, and I said that it was on the basis of the work done in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. You challenged my reading, saying that Habermas had called himself a "Kantian" and I said that it was necessary to read Habermas critically, because he departed from Kant on a number of issues, including the very one under debate.

It is entirely possible to be a good Kantian and still take much from Habermas. It is also possible not to be a Kantian and take much from Habermas. You seem to be claiming that the latter is impossible without good grounds to do so.

Quote:confused:

The statement that was in response to was your statement that this is not an appropriate place to "to try to bring about such a significant revision in English discourse," and that it served merely as an opportunity to "propound [my] views about Foucault and Habermas". If you are uninterested in the conversation, please feel free to stop having it.

QuoteIt's not simply the jargon that irritates me about the 'post-modern theory' that I've read.  It's the combination of jargon with vacuous, incoherent, and/or trivial content that irritates me.

Once again, I fail to see how this is substantially different than much of what goes in Anglo-American philosophy. I presented two real examples of trivial, silly work that was published, one of them even by a reasonably well-known philosopher (Roderick Chisholm). The criticism you've levelled against "post-modernism" applies to other types of philosophy just as readily (Scholastic mediaeval philosophy, analytic philosophy, German idealism) if one is unfamiliar with them. It's a non-criticism: "This is just meaningless piffle! I don't need to understand it."

Quote from: AkrasiaBut nonetheless, I think that it is clear that, in everyday English discourse at least, morally praising someone has a very different meaning for most speakers than aesthetically praising someone.  (Of course, particular judgements can combine elements of both.)

If you combine the points raised in the paper about psychopaths and morality with the paper about how people make moral decisions, it seems pretty clear that the internal distinction in a person's brain produces a strong emotional response or not.  Thus the indifference people feel toward aesthetic judgments and the passion that they often feel toward moral judgments has to do with the emotions raised by consideration of the issue than any rational attribute of the issue.  Thus the person who can't be dispassionate about the portrayal of a Nazi being portrayed as a hero is the person who will consider it a moral issue while the person who can be dispassionate about it will consider it an aesthetic issue.

Quote from: AkrasiaIn any case, it's not surprising that many posters earlier in this thread were confused by  Sett's use of the term 'moral', as it did not appear to fit with everyday English usage of the term.  That was my rather modest point.

To Settembrini raising morality, I think emotion is also the key there, too.

In another thread (I can't find the original reference), someone observed that a big part of the problem is that whenever any makes a disparaging remark about gaming, people take it as a personal criticism of themselves or their group.  The sense of offense that people feel is the emotional response kicking in, which is why their arguments often take on the character of a moral debate, even when the issue is aesthetics.

One problem is that people read what they enjoy about role-playing into what is being discussed and judge it against their preferences.  Thus the person who enjoys a "fair" challenge in their role-playing games and considers going around the rules to win "cheating", fudging is essentially "cheating", which makes it a moral issue.  So they see a person suggestion, for example, that the GM "cheat".

Another problem is that people also imagine themselves playing in a game with the person or technique being described.  Thus if I describe spending a great deal of game time dealing with romances and a person hates that sort of thing or has had bad experiences with romances in their games, they are going to have an emotional response akin to being asked to play in a game with that element.

So I think the reason why these debates take on a moral character well out of proportion to the aesthetics being discussed is that people react emotionally rather that dispassionately to these debates.

Hi Akrasia,

I'm not a big fan of discourse ethics, but I think Knowledge and Human Interests is a really interesting book, and probably under-read today for a variety of reasons. If you've written at all on Habermas' earlier stuff I'd love to check it out; drop me a PM or email if something comes to mind.

OK, I scrolled back through, but I didn't find the part where Pseudoephedrine exposes Roderick Chisolm as a peddler of arrant nonsense. Can somebody point me to the post?

On the Sokal hoax: In general, although I tend to be conservative in my philosophical outlook, I tend to agree with those who view it as a relatively meaningless stunt. I'm no lover of the jargon produced by many humanities departments, but Sokal's work did not help bring any light or clarity to either side, and he seems to me to have taken advantage of the goodwill of the journal's editors.

For some reason I also feel compelled to mention a parallel between Heidegger's discussions of das Ereignis and Dewey's reflections on having an experience in his art book. Actually, at this point the parallel goes fairly deep, except that MH tends to mystify in a way that JD doesn't. (I don't mean 'confuse' by 'mystify' here; more like 'imbue with unnameable religious significance'.)

John M., that nicely brings us back to the real point of this thread. Akrasia and Pseudoephedrine, I would be lying if I said that I didn't find your discussion interesting. I'd also be lying if I said I would read it even if it wasn't being carried out under the false pretense of having anything to do with the subject.

Sett's point, and the real thrust of this thread, is that playstyle disagreements are arguments over values. In that respect it doesn't matter if you separate aesthetic and moral values.

You guys are like two geeks arguing over the use of minisubs at Pearl Harbor, in the middle of a discussion on the reasons for the Japanese decision to attack America instead of the USSR in 1941.

Quote from: John MorrowTo Settembrini raising morality, I think emotion is also the key there, too.

In another thread (I can't find the original reference), someone observed that a big part of the problem is that whenever any makes a disparaging remark about gaming, people take it as a personal criticism of themselves or their group.  The sense of offense that people feel is the emotional response kicking in, which is why their arguments often take on the character of a moral debate, even when the issue is aesthetics.

One problem is that people read what they enjoy about role-playing into what is being discussed and judge it against their preferences.  Thus the person who enjoys a "fair" challenge in their role-playing games and considers going around the rules to win "cheating", fudging is essentially "cheating", which makes it a moral issue.  So they see a person suggestion, for example, that the GM "cheat".

Another problem is that people also imagine themselves playing in a game with the person or technique being described.  Thus if I describe spending a great deal of game time dealing with romances and a person hates that sort of thing or has had bad experiences with romances in their games, they are going to have an emotional response akin to being asked to play in a game with that element.

So I think the reason why these debates take on a moral character well out of proportion to the aesthetics being discussed is that people react emotionally rather that dispassionately to these debates.

I'm right there with you, John, those are good points and an incisive characterization of the problems in the discourse.

I think a lot of the furor in this thread comes from the fact that even after you parse out that meaning from Sett's statements, you see that he's embracing that moral character rather than injecting a mediating response to it, like trying to recognize and curb that reaction in yourself when you feel it arise. Or maybe he's just saying utter shit to provoke others to mount a "vigorous defense" of their positions, and right now he's sitting back and giggling about how much he's "helped the discourse" while we all (well, you all; I'm utterly unqualified, for good or ill) furiously debate Kant and Foucault.:rolleyes:

Speaking of Settembrini, I might as well take this moment to ask if you, Sett, have any intention of completing the other discussions you're involved in; you've promised me responses on a couple of threads. I'm dying to know if the last round of discourse has made us any progress in mutual understanding. I know Tony and John are rip-roarin' in the "making it easy for the characters?" thread, but I'm sure they won't mind if we cut in.

Peace,
-Joel

Quote from: AkrasiaTypically (though not universally) moral claims in everyday English discourse concern obligations on persons (directives that have a kind of 'binding authority' on them), e.g., the claim that it is wrong to break a promise (irrespective of one's wishes).  Moral claims can also describe actions or traits that are praiseworthy, though not strictly speaking obligatory (e.g. 'he is a benevolent person', or 'it would be good of you to help him in his financial difficulties').  The former kinds of moral claims appear to be clearly distinct from aesthetic ones, as it is hard to make sense of 'binding obligations' on persons to evaluate or appreciate works of arts (or other things) in certain ways.

Actually, we've got laws that do just that. The best example are "obscenity" laws which require a work to have no artistic value and to be offensive to community standards. The claim that a work is "obscene" binds us in certain ways - it is illegal to import obscene materials to many countries (including Canada and America), and even illegal to own them in others. Since a work must fulfill both criteria - it must have no artistic value _and_ be offensive to community standards, even fulfilling one of them prevents a work from being labeled obscene. This means that the "artistic value" of a work binds us _not_ to prevent it from being distributed (under our obscenity laws) no matter how offensive we might find it, or wish that it wasn't available.

A counter-argument can be found in feminism as well, that aesthetic claims constitute a form of self-creation or self-determination in the way that moral claims do. To be told that a certain kind of body, or a certain kind of dress are the proper kinds of these things for people to have are aesthetic claims that bind one to accept them (based on the simple assumption "One should do what it is proper to do").

In both of these cases, one involving the law, the other custom, binding claims are being made using aesthetic judgments, whether about the merit of a work, or the merit of a particular kind of appearance. The claims in question may be more or less questionable on their own merits (Should we have such a category as "obscenity"? Should women face this relentless pressure to be "beautiful"?) but they unquestionably exist, and form part of our discussions about who we are and how we should conduct ourselves.

QuoteThe latter kind of moral claims might be analogous to aesthetic judgements (e.g. 'he is a virtuous man' resembles 'he is stylish chap', in that both involve a kind of 'appraisal respect' for someone without any notion of obligation involved), and many virtue ethicists make a great deal of this similarity.

Just to jump in and clarify something that might not be clear, I am closest to virtue ethics theoretically, though I'm not a virtue ethicist per se (I'm not a neo-Aristotelian for the most part, and most VE's are).

QuoteBut nonetheless, I think that it is clear that, in everyday English discourse at least, morally praising someone has a very different meaning for most speakers than aesthetically praising someone.  (Of course, particular judgements can combine elements of both.)

 It's what's under debate, don't forget - whether or not there's legitimate grounds for a distinction between them. If a judgement can contain elements of both, then any distinction is a pragmatic distinction to show which cluster of terms one is focusing on, rather than a philosophical distinction that signifies some difference in kind. I'm cool with the former, not so much with the latter (for the reasons I've elaborated in this thread).

QuoteIn any case, it's not surprising that many posters earlier in this thread were confused by  Sett's use of the term 'moral', as it did not appear to fit with everyday English usage of the term.  That was my rather modest point.

Certainly, and it's a true point (though I suspect we'd disagree about why it didn't fit). But you'd've been better off saying that. It's less likely to get us into ten page discussions.

Quote from: CalithenaOK, I scrolled back through, but I didn't find the part where Pseudoephedrine exposes Roderick Chisolm as a peddler of arrant nonsense. Can somebody point me to the post?

Sorry, it was implicit - I was mentioning it for Akrasia, who I assumed was familiar with it. I like Chisholm at times, but he sticks in my mind as the author of a paper that claimed that we (humans) had personal identities in a philosophical sense because we had a single particle somewhere in our bodies that did not change and that remained in our bodies for our entire lives. He's also Captain "Brains in a Jar!" which is easily the silliest and most meaningless idea to come out of philosophy in the past few years.

QuoteFor some reason I also feel compelled to mention a parallel between Heidegger's discussions of das Ereignis and Dewey's reflections on having an experience in his art book. Actually, at this point the parallel goes fairly deep, except that MH tends to mystify in a way that JD doesn't. (I don't mean 'confuse' by 'mystify' here; more like 'imbue with unnameable religious significance'.)

Neat. I've been told that Dewey and Gadamer also have a lot in common by a pal who's doing his MA on something involving them (and maybe Nietzsche, he changes his mind on that part every so often). I don't know Dewey very well though.

Quote from: MelinglorI think a lot of the furor in this thread comes from the fact that even after you parse out that meaning from Sett's statements, you see that he's embracing that moral character rather than injecting a mediating response to it, like trying to recognize and curb that reaction in yourself when you feel it arise.

No argument from me there.  And please note that I am not claiming that I'm immune to this problem.  I'm most certainly not.

Quote from: MelinglorI know Tony and John are rip-roarin' in the "making it easy for the characters?" thread, but I'm sure they won't mind if we cut in.

I wouldn't mind.  One of the reasons why I like light-touch moderation is that I like organic discussions.

Oh, OK. I think Chisolm's mereological essentialism can be motivated reasonably well for physical objects - even from physics-talk - it's arguable that the reason physicists don't regard shadows whose leading edge moves faster than light as problematic for the special theory of relativity is just because a shadow isn't a physical object from the mereological essentialist's point of view - but it's kind of a nutty view of personal identity.

However, this creates a problem: do you want to say that people aren't physical objects? Either answer can be somewhat uncomfortable, depending on how it's pushed. The discomfort Chisolm's position causes is apparent, but disambiguating personal identity from physical in a comfortable way may not be as easy as it seems, depending on your other metaphysical views.

Quote from: Elliot WilenYou guys are like two geeks arguing over the use of minisubs at Pearl Harbor, in the middle of a discussion on the reasons for the Japanese decision to attack America instead of the USSR in 1941.

Hah, sorry about that. I like the analogy though.

Part of the problem with replying to Settembrini directly is the lack of information about what he means.

If he means "Your creative agenda is entirely derived from your moral values", well, that's pretty fucking stupid for a fistful of reasons (starting from the words "creative agenda" on).

If he means, "Disagreements that seem to be solely about aesthetic matters, like which game is more fun or better designed, turn out to also be moral arguments about how you think people should play," then he's right, but badly stating it.

He's also wrong in presenting the situation as inexorably leading to conflict. Not all moral disagreements have to end with people screaming at one another (I doubt that most do, let alone have to). There are other options that just jumping in and shouting "Fuck your mother, and D&D to boot!"

Quote from: CalithenaOh, OK. I think Chisolm's mereological essentialism can be motivated reasonably well for physical objects - even from physics-talk - it's arguable that the reason physicists don't regard shadows whose leading edge moves faster than light as problematic for the special theory of relativity is just because a shadow isn't a physical object from the mereological essentialist's point of view - but it's kind of a nutty view of personal identity.

However, this creates a problem: do you want to say that people aren't physical objects? Either answer can be somewhat uncomfortable, depending on how it's pushed. The discomfort Chisolm's position causes is apparent, but disambiguating personal identity from physical in a comfortable way may not be as easy as it seems, depending on your other metaphysical views.

You don't have to give up people as physical objects. You just have to give up traditional notions of personal identity. I'm pretty comfortable with doing that (in line with Parfit's work) just because it's the choice that causes the least disturbance to anything else. YMMV, of course.

Fair point: I still haven't decided what I think about that. I don't have a principled objection to a continuously existing person being a sum of physical objects over time, though, so long as some coherent notion of personal identity which gives unity to that sum can be made out.

I was basically just saying that even though Chisolm's view on that particular issue is kind of nutty, he's adopting it for principled reasons against the background of at least some views that aren't as nutty.

Quote from: CalithenaFair point: I still haven't decided what I think about that. I don't have a principled objection to a continuously existing person being a sum of physical objects over time, though, so long as some coherent notion of personal identity which gives unity to that sum can be made out.

I was basically just saying that even though Chisolm's view on that particular issue is kind of nutty, he's adopting it for principled reasons against the background of at least some views that aren't as nutty.

Sure, it all makes sense once you're familiar with the discourse. It's exactly the same with the various post-modern discourses though, which is what this was about originally though.

QuotePart of the problem with replying to Settembrini directly is the lack of information about what he means.

Well, I'd appreciate if he'd comment on my gloss of what I think he means, a few pages back. But if I'm right, what he's saying is basically what I started to feel a decade or more ago. Namely, the way people conceptualize what they're doing when they play an RPG, which of course is related to what they actually enjoy about playing, can differ so vastly that they really have little to talk about. Again, it'd be like going to a play and expecting it to be like a hocky match, or reading a textbook and complaining about the plot. These aren't precise analogies for the paradigms of "RPGing" that people carry around in their heads, but they show the kind of error that's being made. As Sett has also said, the fundamental common activity of what people call roleplaying is "extrapolation of virtual situations through verbal negotiation". We might quibble with some of that or have to refine it to either include or exclude stuff like LARP or Diplomacy. But the key as I see it is that (according to general usage) (a) unlike many games, RPGs are representational, and (b) unlike, say, board wargames, which are representational, the situations and resolutions in RPGs are frequently produced socially rather than mechanically, at many points in the course of the game.

(Similar things have been said in the past; I won't enumerate them but I don't want to shortchange them by implying that Sett is the only person to have come to this revelation.)

So, two things from this. First, the social factor looms large: since there's ample leeway for discretion in both resolution and motivation, the way that a game is played depends strongly on the "aesthetic-ethical structure" that the participants subscribe to. This is not unlike the fact that a judge in real life is imbued with certain powers (like deciding court cases) but they are also expected to use those powers in an ethical fashion (according to notions of fairness). Compare a politician, who works under very different ethical principles--basically, they're not philosopher-kings: they're expected to fight for their constituents' interests.

Second, the "aesthetic structure" (what we value in the game) that guides the "ethical structure" (how we should act in order to maximize that value) isn't specified by Sett's "method of roleplay". In short, just because the game involves people making stuff up (with final say distributed in some manner--possibly formally, possibly socially as well), that doesn't mean that this group of people making stuff up is doing so for the same reason as that group.

In turn this means that someone in group B who's talking about the ethics of gameplay is going to fundamentally disagree with someone in group A--but not because of ethics, because of aesthetics. It'd be a bit like putting a skating judge behind home plate. Both the judge and a baseball umpire know that they're supposed to be impartial, as far as possible. But the skating judge is going to mess things up by calling balls and strikes based on the pitcher's form, rather than whether the ball goes over home plate.

In essence, Settembrini's saying: skating coaches, please shut up, we're trying to put together a baseball team here. And you know, once you achieve that focus, you can now have some very interesting and useful discussions about pitching vs. hitting, whether to sacrifice or steal, who is the better outfielder, and so forth.

And by the way: Philosophers, please take it to the off-topic forum. Or at least, if you're going to persist in hijacking this thread, please try not to do so in future threads.