Quote from: AkrasiaWell, whatever.  The fact of the matter is that there is a large literature and debate concerning the cognitive function of emotions.

I think, at this point, we are likely talking past each other.  I'll accept blame for that, since I've been talking in vague terms.  Let me try to correct that.

My argument is not that emotions are not useful nor is it that emotions are not a part of "normal" cognitive functions and moral reasoning.  I am specifically addressing your own comments concerning rational thinking and false beliefs and pointing out that, using such standards, I don't think any moral system fits the criteria that you have setting for reasoning that you personally find acceptable.  For example, much earlier in the thread, you wrote:

Quote from: AkrasiaWhat is it for a belief to be 'caused by excessively rational thinking'?  What the fuck is 'excessively rational thinking'?

I think that people should form beliefs on the basis of reason (evidence, logic, abduction, etc.).  Failing that, what beliefs they do have, if not based on reason, should at least be compatible with reason.  All other beliefs should be rejected.

If that makes me 'excessively rational' then that's a label I will gladly accept.

Now read the quote I posted from Damasio, "had grown up accustomed to thinking that the mechanisms of reason existed in a separate province of the mind, where emotion should not be allowed to intrude, and when I thought of the brain behind that mind, I envisioned separate neural systems for reason and emotion[.]"  First, I think that's what was meant by "excessively rational".  Second, I think the brain research by Joshua Greene and others suggest that reason and emotion really do exist in "separate neural systems".  So the question is where emotion fits in to your recipe for reason "(evidence, logic, abduction, etc.)".

Further, you claimed:

Quote from: AkrasiaBut I should form my beliefs on the basis of the best arguments and evidence available. This is certainly compatible with recognising that I have limited evidence and cognitive abilities.

Quote from: AkrasiaSo anyhow, here is a pretty general argument.

We have two possible explanations for everything in universe:

1.  An explanation that relies on a purely naturalist ontology (i.e. an explanation that posits solely a 'naturalistic' or 'physicalist' metaphysics; nothing exists that cannot, ultimately, be explained by the 'laws of nature').

2. An explanation that combines a naturalist and supernaturalist ontology (i.e. an explanation that posits supernatural entities, such as God or gods, angels, souls, pixies, or whatever, in addition to everything else).

Do we have any reason for preferring 2 over 1?

Well, to make a long but pretty straightforward story short, no. Engaging in some basic, very general abductive reasoning, we can see that 1 is all we need.  So we have no reason to go around positing the existence of unicorns, pixies, or gods.  (Actually, a stronger argument exists that naturalist and supernaturalist explanations are fundamentally incompatible, but I won't get into that here.)

Finally, you wrote, "[... I]t does not require 'faith' to disbelieve (or simply not form a belief in the existence of) something for which there is no evidence (or that contradicts the available evidence)." and "All I'm asserting is the rather simple (indeed, trivial) point that a belief formed inductively (i.e. on the basis of available evidence and argument) is not a case of 'faith'. So my belief, based on an evidential argument, that a certain conception of God is false is not a belief based on faith. That's it."

Once you accept emotions and feelings as well as utility into the realm of what you accept as reason and evidence, you have essentially opened the door to claims that religion is a matter of reason and evidence and not simply faith.  On what basis do you argue that moral prohibitions against torturing puppies because it feels wrong or contributes to personal survival are wrong are matters of reason while a belief in God because it feels right and seems to contribute to personal survival is simply a matter of faith?

Quote from: AkrasiaHowever, you seem to be assuming that if the emotions play any necessary role in practical reasoning that somehow moral theory is dead.  Sorry to disappoint you, but this simply is not the case.  Many leading contemporary moral theorists accord to the emotions a necessary (though not sufficient) role without holding that the emotions are irrational, or that doing so undermines moral discourse.

On what basis do they claim that emotions are rational without getting into a turtles all the way down argument or begging the question?

Quote from: AkrasiaNo, sorry.  The point is that in order to engage in effective practical reasoning certain emotions need to function in people.  There are a number of experiments that document that people with impaired emotional responses to certain environmental cues actually reason about risk far more poorly than people with those emotional responses (despite the fact that both sets of people seem equally able to ratiocinate).  Why should we think that it would be different in the case of psychopaths?

Because the evidence suggests that psychopaths often are quite successful and do quite well for themselves.  In other words, the defects that you are describing do not seem to be there.  Not all psychopaths are killers (or we would be in very big trouble with that 4% figure).  Many simply use others to get what they want and plenty are quite successful at it.  

Quote from: AkrasiaBoth kinds of emotional deficiencies produce deficiencies in the ability of persons to engage in practical reason (in the one case, deliberations about risk, in the other case, deliberations about their relations with others).

And I think your assumption that the psychopath suffers "deficiencies" is not necessarily supported by the evidence.  As the one article I provided a link to says, "'Likeable,' 'Charming,' 'Intelligent,' 'Alert,' 'Impressive,' 'Confidence-inspiring,' and 'A great success with the ladies': These are the sorts of descriptions repeatedly used by Cleckley in his famous case-studies of psychopaths."  Dos that sound like someone suffering from deficiencies to you?  Later, the same article says, "Psychopaths seem to have in abundance the very traits most desired by normal persons. The untroubled self-confidence of the psychopath seems almost like an impossible dream and is generally what 'normal' people seek to acquire when they attend assertiveness training classes. In many instances, the magnetic attraction of the psychopath for members of the opposite sex seems almost supernatural."  Again, does this sound like a deficiency to you?

Now, after the first quote, the article goes on to add, "They are also, of course, 'irresponsible,' 'self-destructive,' and the like." but for those things to be bad, we need to assume that responsibility is good and that self-destruction is inherently bad and for the psychopath to be deficient, we need to show that they are worse, in this regard, than normal people.

As a final bit of evidence here, I'll point out that you can find victims groups and online communities of the victims of psychopaths yet the psychopaths who victimized them are often still victimizing others and need not such support groups.  Consider what that says about each group's deficiencies.

Quote from: AkrasiaIt's not 'gymnastics' at all.  Rather, you're confusing what is generally known as 'theoretical reason' (roughly, observing phenomena from a third-person perspective -- judgements that concern what to believe) with 'practical reason' (roughly, deliberating from a 'first-person' perspective about 'what to do').

And what does it mean when the practical reason differs from the theoretical reason?

Quote from: AkrasiaBut it might lead me to hope that when I engage in practical reasoning that those emotional responses do kick in at the right time.

So now we are on to "hope"?  

Quote from: AkrasiaBelieve it or not, I actually have a job.  So I apologise if sometimes I try to make a point quickly rather than explain it to your satisfaction.

Oh, I understand that and I've tried to cut you a lot of slack because of that.  But you should at least do what you did below with John Mackie's theory and provide a one sentence summary of what you think the connection is between the theory and the argument and/or what the theory says.

Quote from: AkrasiaI think that there's a fair amount of support for the view, but labelling it as a 'fact' may be premature.

Then why did you do it?

Quote from: AkrasiaI assume that you are advancing something like John Mackie's 'error theory' of morality (roughly, that claims about moral properties refer to things that do not actually exist, and so are all in some sense 'fictions')?

My claim is not that they don't exist.  My claim is that they don't exist within the realm of evidence and reason that you've advocated much earlier in this thread.

Quote from: AkrasiaFair enough, but you should know that that position in meta-ethics is a minority one, and is one that has been widely criticised in the decades since it was first advanced.  (Although I notice that your hero Joshua Greene seems to support some version of it).  I personally don't find it convincing; or rather, I find at least two alternative meta-ethical views far more plausible, but it probably would not be helpful to get into those here.

Oh, I think that Joshua Greene is quite wrong, however I think he's doing an excellent job of following your criteria for what constitutes evidence and beliefs based upon evidence rather than faith.  Please bear in mind that Joshua Greene's primary field is neurobiology and he's trying to find some purely rational basis for morality.  What is he missing that you think he should be doing?

Quote from: AkrasiaIf you'd like a good survey of contemporary views in meta-ethics, I recommend the introduction to: S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton (eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Thanks for the recommendation.

Quote from: Akrasia(Also, a short reply to Mackie's error theory on behalf of moral realism can be found at: http://stopthatcrow.blogspot.com/2006/03/errors-of-error-theory-mackie.html .)

All I'll say here is that I'd suggest rereading that paper on psychopaths ("Is It Irrational to Be Amoral?") and doing some additional research into Psychopaths as described and defined by Robert Hare and then reread the arguments made on that web page.

Quote from: AkrasiaFrankly, though, even if some version of moral scepticism or error theory proved to be the correct account of moral discourse (i.e. the correct meta-ethical theory), it would not change my views about the non-existence of God at all (after all, Mackie also famously formulated the POE argument as a valid deductive argument in the mid 20th Century).

Not directly, no.

Quote from: AkrasiaThis is why I find this whole meta-ethical discussion orthogonal to the subject of this thread.

There have been several major subjects discussed in this thread.

Quote from: AkrasiaIt is neither socking nor shocking to me.  My overall point is merely that you seem to think that this one claim about psychopaths and the role of emotional responses in moral motivation is a devastating one for moral theory and necessarily yields moral scepticism.

I think it should yield moral skepticism if you apply the various constraints and other ideas that you've also expressed on this thread.  I'm sure that many philosophers and theologians can escape this problem.  I'm curious how you do.

Quote from: AkrasiaAt the risk of repeating a point made earlier, but just to be clear: even if some version of moral scepticism or error theory proved to be the correct correct meta-ethical theory, it would not in any way change my view about the non-existence of God (how could it?), or my view that it would be better for me to know the truth about morality (viz. that it is only a 'fiction') than to persist in a false belief about it.

Ah, that I don't agree with.  To address the "how could it?", it could by my making you take another look at the validity of various assumptions that you hold.  To address the truth issue, I think you simply need to consider what it would mean to your world view if you were to suddenly belief that moral skepticism were correct.  Are you suggesting that nothing would change?

Quote from: Akrasia(Of course, as I've noted earlier, I don't find the reasons that you advance in favour of moral scepticism convincing, but that's a wholly separate matter.)

Why don't you find them convincing?  For purely rational reasons or are there other components involved?  That's why, for example, I called you on talking about something as a "fact" when even you later admitted it was premature to do so.  Why are you overstating evidence to support your point?

I used to be an atheist .

 That changed recently. Less than  5 years ago.

Being an atheist is still a valid choice , most of the time.

- E.W.C.

Quote from: AkrasiaThere is a fundamental distinction between what is known as ‘internalism’ with respect to moral propositions and what is known as ‘externalism’.

What I'm saying is that psychopaths seem to offer a third category.  I't not simply that the psychopath is not motivated by a moral theory but that they don't understand the point of the moral theory because of their lack of any motivation or feeling.  In other words, it's not simply that the moral theory is inadequate to motivate the psychopath.  It is unable to motivate the psychopath because they lack the emotional context necessary to understand it in any meaningful sense.  

Yes, a psychopath can understand that hitting your friend is wrong.  But for them, you might was well be arguing that speeding is wrong or chewing with your mouth open is wrong.  It's simply an arbitrary social convention to them.  The special quality that makes moral decisions so difficult and compelling for normal people is absent.  How can a moral proposition be "correct" when it's a meaningless and arbitrary position to a person who lacks any emotional compulsion to care about it?

To the psychopath, there seems to be little distinction between a moral question and an aesthetic question.  Thus, is the distinction between a moral question and an aesthetic question simply the emotional context of the moral question?  In fact, people treat aesthetic questions that produce an emotional response as if they were moral questions.

Quote from: AkrasiaI’m not sure what you’re trying to claim here.  The utilitarian merely holds that happiness/pleasure is the one thing that all sentient creatures seek for its own sake (even psychopaths).  When we combine this claim about objective value with a commitment to impartiality (the normative component of utilitarianism) we end up with utilitarianism.

Is the "normative component of utilitarianism" that falls down for the psychopath.  Not only do they not care about impartiality but they don't expect it from others.  You might as well tell them that it's good to make other people happy because it makes angels smile.

You should look at Greene's dissertation if, for no other reason, his blunt description of utilitarianism's liabilities is hilarious (just before he advocates a form of utilitarianism).

Quote from: AkrasiaWell, very crudely, Sidgwick thought that rational egoists were emotionally impaired, since they lacked a sense of ‘humanity’ and ‘sympathy’ despite being fully rational.  Consequently, utilitarians should design institutions and practices that cultivate a sense of sympathy as much as possible in people, and also design institutions that deter and punish those people (psychopaths) in whom this capacity is absent, in order to better maximise overall happiness in society.

But that presupposes that both humanity and sympathy are superior and their absence is an impairment.  While they do create some liabilities for the psychopath, they also create advantages, particularly against people with humanity and sympathy.  

Quote from: AkrasiaRead my previous post.  Look at the work of Damasio and other neurologists and cognitive scientists working in this area.  It’s a complicated topic.

Correct.  But most of the research that involves scanning human minds while they make moral decisions suggests that it's not an entirely rational process and at least some research suggests that we decide and then justify rather than considering and then deciding.

Quote from: AkrasiaBut the short answer is that they don’t help us form ‘true beliefs’ in terms of explaining the way the world works.  Rather, they help in practical deliberation (i.e. deciding ‘what to do’ in particular circumstances) because they make certain features of our environment (internal and external) especially salient (often in ways that aren’t explicit to us).

Correct.  But as Greene and others (including game theorists) point out, they can be as much of a liability as help, guiding us to the wrong decisions.  And emotional responses can create false beliefs (such as a mother blaming her son's suicide on Dungeons and Dragons).  You may also want to look at human behavior related to responses during disasters.  

Quote from: AkrasiaIn various ‘gambling experiments’, for example, people with impaired emotional responses to subtle environment cues performed far more poorly when deliberating about what to do than people with healthy or ‘normal’ emotional responses.  The ratiocinating of both sets of people, in contrast, was comparable.

Correct.  But all emotional impairment is not equivalent, nor equally disadvantageous.

Quote from: AkrasiaMaybe I should read Greene’s dissertation, but I find the quote irrelevant to the discussion.  I’ve read contemporary debates in meta-ethics, as I’m sure Greene has.  I can’t imagine that he managed to defend a dissertation at Princeton if he actually attributed such a simplistic view to people working in contemporary meta-ethics.

No, his argument is not that simplistic.  I understand if you don't read his dissertation (it's quite long) but I suspect it would be more valuable to you than any summary I could provide if you are really interested in what a researcher into the neurological roots of moral decisions thinks about moral philosophy.

Quote from: John MorrowYou don't have to trust their self-assessment.  You need only look at their success.

Success at what?

QuoteWhat other damage do they suffer?  Name a few specific things.

Like the rest of us, they can run the gamut from emotional abuse, to physical abuse, to neglect, etc. They just do something different with it than the rest of us. Their problem is they lack the emotional responses healthy people do. Why? Are you trying to say psychopaths are actually the healthy people and the rest of us who do feel guilt and remorse are the damaged ones?

QuoteAnd why should we want to survive both as individuals and as a species, especially if the world is as awful as you are claiming it is?  I find it humorous that you damn God for making the world so horrible yet you defend as rational instincts that mindlessly make us want to survive as individuals and as a species.  Huh?

You apparently aren't reading what I wrote. I never said instincts were rational. What makes an instinctual urge rational or not is what we do with it. That we want to survive is instinctual. What happens after that is open to judgement. Also, I don't damn god, as I don't believe in god. I don't believe god made the world, so damning it would be silly and pointless. The world is the way it is... I simply hold up it's design as sufficient evidence of the non-existence of a specific idea of god. I don't need a god to find value in my own life, or to hold as valuable the lives of others.

Quote from: malleus arianorumI don't want to derail the thread but take a look at Matthew 13 where Jesus explains that some people recieve the word but nothing comes of it. Also notice that he speaks in parables to prevent some people from understanding and turning to him. I.e. despite what your Protestant friends may have said, it is a 'bibilical truth' that the Bible does not auto-convert everyone who reads it.

Well, obviously the bible doesn't "auto-convert", I've read it and I certainly wasn't converted. I just don't understand what that has to do with the bible's validity.

 

QuoteThe 'reason' the Bible was compiled was that the churches came out of hiding & persecution and got to compare notes. Secondly, although Arianism originated in the East it is not the teaching of the Orthodox Church. They retained Trinitarianism --the distinctive creed of Christianity.

The reason the bible was compiled was because Emperor Constantine wanted a unified state religion and felt an "official" religious text would be instrumental in that.

QuoteLastly, you can be absolutely certain that books were excluded from the Canon (that was the whole point! ) The challenge to Faith is: did they exclude rightly?

That's part of my point. How do we know with reasonable certainty whether they excluded rightly? What made what was excluded less valid and why should I trust that they were qualified to judge that when a few centuries had past since Jesus lived?

Quote from: SigmundSuccess at what?

Playing other people who are not psychopaths as irrational fools.

Quote from: SigmundLike the rest of us, they can run the gamut from emotional abuse, to physical abuse, to neglect, etc. They just do something different with it than the rest of us. Their problem is they lack the emotional responses healthy people do. Why? Are you trying to say psychopaths are actually the healthy people and the rest of us who do feel guilt and remorse are the damaged ones?

I'm trying to say that there are benefits and liabilities to being either normal or a psychopath and it is by no means a given that the psychopath suffers a net deficiency.

Quote from: John MorrowPlaying other people who are not psychopaths as irrational fools.

And this success is supposed to indicate what exactly?

QuoteI'm trying to say that there are benefits and liabilities to being either normal or a psychopath and it is by no means a given that the psychopath suffers a net deficiency.

It is to me, mainly because what they gain doesn't equal what they lack. For someone who defends god and morality so vigorously, you seem to have quite a bit of admiration for a segment of the population that is entirely lacking in the one thing that makes life so worth living... that being meaningful relationships with other people. While psychopaths can win friends and influence people through charm and wit and likeability, they use these as tools of manipulation to further their entirely self-centered goals, unlike people who are truely charming, witty, and likeable naturally. The value of what I'm talking about will completely escape a psychopath, but then that's the point isn't it.

Remind me, why are we talking about psychopaths again? Was it because for some reason you don't believe life is valuable, or that it's somehow irrational to have a survival instinct?

Quote from: John Morrow...
My argument is not that emotions are not useful nor is it that emotions are not a part of "normal" cognitive functions and moral reasoning.  I am specifically addressing your own comments concerning rational thinking and false beliefs and pointing out that, using such standards, I don't think any moral system fits the criteria that you have setting for reasoning that you personally find acceptable.  
...
So the question is where emotion fits in to your recipe for reason "(evidence, logic, abduction, etc.)"
...

I think that the distinction between 'practical reason' and 'theoretical reason' is key here (and apologise for not making this explicit earlier – the question whether God exists is a decidedly 'theoretical one', and so I had previously been focused on that approach to thinking about questions, whereas a number of moral theories ascribe a role to the emotions in terms of 'practical reason').  

Questions about what to believe are questions for theoretical reason.  Now, one can recognise that the moral psychology of individuals involves (perhaps necessarily) the emotions, while nonetheless forming theoretical beliefs about the nature of moral psychology (and moral discourse more generally) without engaging the emotions (or rather, positing claims in a manner that will be accessible to the theoretical reason of others, irrespective of their particular emotional responses).  These beliefs do not need to engage one's motivations (about 'what to do') in any way.

In short, the two perspectives are distinct.  My comments about how to form one's beliefs all have to do with theoretical reason (which is compatible with recognising a key role for the emotions when one is deliberating about 'what to do').

Quote from: John Morrow...
On what basis do they claim that emotions are rational without getting into a turtles all the way down argument or begging the question?...

I can't explain every possible meta-ethical theory that can answer this question here (though I have some quick comments about this later on), but here is very crude and short answer for one view (viz. Adam Smith's 'impartial observer' theory of morality): whether a moral proposition (e.g. 'murdering an innocent person is wrong') is true or false depends on how an ideally situated observer (with a fully 'ideal' human psychology, including emotional responses, etc.) would respond to cases in which an innocent person is murdered.  That's just what morality is according to the 'ideal observer' theory of moral sentiments – it gives you the necessary conditions for testing moral propositions.  And it certainly doesn't deny that some people might fail to be an 'ideal observer' in many ways (including the way in which psychopaths fail).

Now, keep in mind that I have (a.) grossly oversimplified the view for the sake of brevity, and (b.) think that this is one of the least plausible meta-ethical theories going (I chose it for its relative simplicity).  But it provides a complete naturalistic account of the nature of moral discourse, and in a way that grants a fundamental role to the emotions.

Quote from: John Morrow...
Because the evidence suggests that psychopaths often are quite successful and do quite well for themselves.  In other words, the defects that you are describing do not seem to be there.  Not all psychopaths are killers (or we would be in very big trouble with that 4% figure).  Many simply use others to get what they want and plenty are quite successful at it...

Sure, I don't deny that some (perhaps even most) psychopaths can be happy and 'successful'.  But I'm not sure why the relative 'success' of psychopaths in living happy lives is relevant to the question of whether or not morality exists.

The concern that you describe is hardly a new one.  Worries about 'cunning knaves' and rational agents 'getting away with immoral actions' are hardly new (see Plato's discussion of the 'Ring of Gyges' in The Republic).  Yet moral theory hardly collapsed 2500 years ago.

Quote from: John Morrow...
Again, does this sound like a deficiency to you?
...
As a final bit of evidence here, I'll point out that you can find victims groups and online communities of the victims of psychopaths yet the psychopaths who victimized them are often still victimizing others and need not such support groups.  Consider what that says about each group's deficiencies. ...

The fact that psychopaths lack a basic capacity for empathy is what their deficiency consists in – they lack a psychological feature that 96 percent of the population possesses, and that most people value (even if psychopaths don't).  Moreover, it's a feature that, were it not overwhelmingly dominant in the species, would very likely have led to our extinction some time ago (see, e.g., Brian Skyrm's Evolution of the Social Contract).

Quote from: John Morrow...
And what does it mean when the practical reason differs from the theoretical reason?

I'm not sure what you mean by this.  Do you have an example in mind?

Quote from: John Morrow...
So now we are on to "hope"?  
...
Then why did you do it?

Now you're being either pointlessly uncharitable or irritatingly nit-picky.  (The 'hope' in any case refers to my 'hope' that my emotional structure works properly; I don't know whether it does right now, as I've never been subjected to the relevant tests.)

Quote from: John Morrow...
All I'll say here is that I'd suggest rereading that paper on psychopaths ("Is It Irrational to Be Amoral?") and doing some additional research into Psychopaths as described and defined by Robert Hare and then reread the arguments made on that web page. .

Why is that 'all you'll say'?  You chastise me for not explaining things adequately, and then go on to make vague comments like this?  Why not just explain why you think that the paper refutes the arguments made on the web page?

Anyhow, I read that psychopaths paper a while ago (and, admittedly, very quickly).  While I found it very interesting (it is a good paper), I don't recall anything in it that even addressed 'moral realism', let alone refuted it.  Perhaps I'm mistaken.  I'll look at it again when I have some time.

Quote from: John Morrow...
I think it should yield moral skepticism if you apply the various constraints and other ideas that you've also expressed on this thread.  I'm sure that many philosophers and theologians can escape this problem.  I'm curious how you do.

There are a number of possible meta-ethical theories out there:

1. Non-naturalist moral realism.
2. Naturalist non-reductionist moral realism.
3. Naturalist, reductionist moral realism.
4. Naturalist 'expressivism' (a.k.a. 'quasi-realism' or 'projectivism').
5. A 'practical reason' Kantian approach (some kind of 'contractualism').
6. A 'practical reason' Hobbesian approach (some kind of 'contractarianism').
7. Moral scepticism/error theory.
Etc.

Now, as far as I can tell, your whole point about psychopaths poses a serious problem for only theory 5 (and only a very 'orthodox' understanding of Kant's moral theory).  I find 1 wholly implausible (for reasons I won't get into here), and the difference between 6 & 7 often difficult to discern (although advocates of both views claim that there is a difference).  

Overall, I think that 2 and 4 are most plausible.  Neither one is a form of 'moral scepticism', and neither one is in any way adversely affected by your point concerning psychopaths.

Quote from: SigmundAnd this success is supposed to indicate what exactly?

Follow the thread back to where that line of discussion started.  You wrote, "Yes, it really is. Psychopaths are deviants who are damaged and in need of help."  Why do you think they need help?

Quote from: SigmundIt is to me, mainly because what they gain doesn't equal what they lack.

By what measure are you making that assessment?

Quote from: SigmundFor someone who defends god and morality so vigorously, you seem to have quite a bit of admiration for a segment of the population that is entirely lacking in the one thing that makes life so worth living... that being meaningful relationships with other people.

I don't admire them at all.  I think they are an excellent model for evil sentient creatures in role-playing games, which is how I came upon various research into  them.  But I also don't think that assessment can be supported based simply on entirely rational and grounds which often seem to wind up boiling down to some variant of utilitarianism.  I'm curious if there is some angle to this that I'm missing.

Quote from: SigmundWhile psychopaths can win friends and influence people through charm and wit and likeability, they use these as tools of manipulation to further their entirely self-centered goals, unlike people who are truely charming, witty, and likeable naturally. The value of what I'm talking about will completely escape a psychopath, but then that's the point isn't it.

Correct, though there is some evidence that normal people find some psychopathic characteristics appealing and attractive (consider why we use the word "cool" as a positive and what that means).

Quote from: SigmundRemind me, why are we talking about psychopaths again? Was it because for some reason you don't believe life is valuable, or that it's somehow irrational to have a survival instinct?

There is a scene in Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy where Zaphod talks about removing Arthur Dent's brain (to give it to the mice) and replacing it with a robot brain that will say, "I'm confused" and "Where's the tea?" and Zaphod adds that nobody will notice the difference.  Arthur says, "I'll notice!" to which Zaphod replies, "No you won't.  You'll be programmed not to."

I believe that life is valuable and it's good to have a survival instinct.  And while you can explain that via evolutionary theory, all that really tells us is that we are programmed to feel that way, not that it is either rational or justified to think that way.  

What the psychopath shows us is someone who isn't programmed to feel moral thoughts won't develop them rationally, as this paper (the link I posted earlier is now broken but this one seems to work) describes.  As the paper discusses, the psychopath challenges "the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies" or, I would add, the supernatural.

Quote from: John MorrowAh, that I don't agree with.  To address the "how could it?", it could by my making you take another look at the validity of various assumptions that you hold.  To address the truth issue, I think you simply need to consider what it would mean to your world view if you were to suddenly belief that moral skepticism were correct.  Are you suggesting that nothing would change?
...

Actually, not that much would change.

Interestingly, after presenting his argument in favour of 'error theory' in his book Ethics, Mackie devotes the rest of the book to arguing about what rules society should adopt to regulate relations among persons.  For all practical purposes, these 'rules' operate exactly like moral rules (and can be evaluated critically, revised, etc.).  So, while Mackie is keen to deny a certain metaphysical view about the nature of ethical propositions, in practice he ends up admitting that we need ethical-like rules in order to live in society (indeed, in order for society to even be possible).

Don't get me wrong: I would be disappointed if I learned that error theory (or some other version of moral scepticism) were the correct meta-ethical theory.  But I would still find it hard not to refer to concepts like 'justice' and 'human rights' in my interactions with the rest of humanity.

(In contrast, I find it rather easy to get by without supernatural concepts like 'God', 'angel', 'soul', etc.)

Quote from: John Morrow...  How can a moral proposition be "correct" when it's a meaningless and arbitrary position to a person who lacks any emotional compulsion to care about it?

It can be correct in precisely the same way that any other proposition can be correct even if plenty of people don't understand it, or don't act in ways that would demonstrate understanding.

E.g. There have been studies that show that a person whose brain has been damaged in a certain place can (a.) realise that they are thirsty, and (b.) know that the glass of water in front of them will get rid of their thirst, but (c.) nonetheless fail to drink it (because some aspect of their reasoning ability has been impaired).  Does this suddenly render the proposition 'drinking water will end one's thirst' incorrect?  Please.

Quote from: John Morrow...
Is the "normative component of utilitarianism" that falls down for the psychopath.  Not only do they not care about impartiality but they don't expect it from others...

By 'normative component' I didn't mean what ought to motivate people to act in certain ways (sorry for the confusion).  Rather, I was referring to the proper perspective (according to utilitarianism) from which judgements about whether a particular action or policy should be judged to be morally correct or incorrect should be made.

Quote from: John Morrow...
But that presupposes that both humanity and sympathy are superior and their absence is an impairment.  While they do create some liabilities for the psychopath, they also create advantages, particularly against people with humanity and sympathy.

Sure, and Sidgwick would not deny that.  His concern is with devising a system of moral rules that will apply to society as a whole.  This requires him to address the fact that some people simply will not be motivated to act morally (due to some emotional impairment, or whatever, despite being perfectly rational).  Thus the rules of morality have to address such aberrations, especially if their actions can be harmful to others.

Quote from: John Morrow...
Correct.  But as Greene and others (including game theorists) point out, they can be as much of a liability as help, guiding us to the wrong decisions.

Right, but they help more often they hinder (or at least they did under the circumstances in which they were beneficial in terms of species survival – it's not clear whether they continue to be beneficial in contemporary society, although it seems likely that, on balance, they are).

Quote from: John MorrowFollow the thread back to where that line of discussion started.  You wrote, "Yes, it really is. Psychopaths are deviants who are damaged and in need of help."  Why do you think they need help?

Because apparently it's in my nature to want to help those I perceive to be missing something. Because I know what they are missing when they don't.

QuoteBy what measure are you making that assessment?

By my own life experience. What do you use to measure the quality of experiences? Perhaps you can tell me specifically what you think they gain by their lack of guilt remorse, and capacity for emotional attachment that improves the quality of their lives to the point that lacking meaningful relationships with other people would be worth it.

QuoteI don't admire them at all.  I think they are an excellent model for evil sentient creatures in role-playing games, which is how I came upon various research into  them.  But I also don't think that assessment can be supported based simply on entirely rational and grounds which often seem to wind up boiling down to some variant of utilitarianism.  I'm curious if there is some angle to this that I'm missing.

I guess my lack of formal education is causing me to miss something here. Lets say, for arguement's sake, that assessment can't be supported simply on rational grounds. What does that have to do with the value of life, either one's own or the lives of others? Why do you value life, if indeed you do?

QuoteCorrect, though there is some evidence that normal people find some psychopathic characteristics appealing and attractive (consider why we use the word "cool" as a positive and what that means).

Lots of people want lots of things that can't have and often don't even understand. So what? I wouldn't mind being charming and likeable myself, but I wouldn't ever want to give up my capacity for empathy and emotional attachment to get those traits. Besides, psychopaths aren't really likeable and charming,  what they are is manipulative and dishonest. They only seem to be charming and likeable.

QuoteThere is a scene in Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy where Zaphod talks about removing Arthur Dent's brain (to give it to the mice) and replacing it with a robot brain that will say, "I'm confused" and "Where's the tea?" and Zaphod adds that nobody will notice the difference.  Arthur says, "I'll notice!" to which Zaphod replies, "No you won't.  You'll be programmed not to."

Yes, I'm familiar with it.

QuoteI believe that life is valuable and it's good to have a survival instinct.  And while you can explain that via evolutionary theory, all that really tells us is that we are programmed to feel that way, not that it is either rational or justified to think that way.  

Ok.

QuoteWhat the psychopath shows us is someone who isn't programmed to feel moral thoughts won't develop them rationally, as this paper (the link I posted earlier is now broken but this one seems to work) describes.  As the paper discusses, the psychopath challenges "the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies" or, I would add, the supernatural.

I think I've already agreed with you that "morality" isn't rational. I don't agree that it's irrational, but I do agree it isn't rational. I also don't believe in the "supernatural", so I don't agree there. Are you trying to say that someone lacking in a belief in the supernatural isn't capable of developing morality?

Quote from: Hastur T. FannonWhat I think malleus is saying is that the PoE does not and has never presented a huge crisis for the Christian religion...

Of course it never did, and does not now, for the simple fact that the overwhelming majority of Christians are simply ignorant of it.  (I don’t know whether it would pose a challenge if people were aware of it; I’m often surprised by how readily some people ignore problems with and challenges to their established beliefs.)

But it did and does challenge (at least many of) those serious Christian thinkers who are aware of it (including some of the most important philosophers and theologians in the Cathlolic tradition).

Quote from: Hastur T. Fannon… When used in a theological context "omnipotent" doesn't simply mean "all-powerful" and "benevolent" doesn't simply mean "nice"…

These are difficult concepts to understand, to be sure, but I have yet to see how the pro-POE advocates and the anti-POE advocates have fundamentally different understandings of them (or at least understandings that cannot, and have not, been addressed in their many debates).

Quote from: Hastur T. FannonTheology is an attempt to understand humanity's collective experience of God.  Christians understand God to be nice and all-powerful, but (as the PoE shows) this isn't consistant with our experience of the suffering we see in the world.  So something else is going on here and the formal description of the PoE is a great starting point to discuss all sorts of concepts surrounding, God, freedom, evil, good, etc., etc.

Right, theologians ‘beg the question’ in favour of the existence of God when it comes to analysing the POE argument(s), whereas philosophers don’t.  Fair enough.

Quote from: AkrasiaIn short, the two perspectives are distinct.  My comments about how to form one's beliefs all have to do with theoretical reason (which is compatible with recognising a key role for the emotions when one is deliberating about 'what to do').

But to evaluate the value and justification of using emotions to deliberate "What to do?" (the "practical reason"), doesn't one have to engage in "theoretical reason"?

Quote from: AkrasiaQuestions about what to believe are questions for theoretical reason.  Now, one can recognise that the moral psychology of individuals involves (perhaps necessarily) the emotions, while nonetheless forming theoretical beliefs about the nature of moral psychology (and moral discourse more generally) without engaging the emotions (or rather, positing claims in a manner that will be accessible to the theoretical reason of others, irrespective of their particular emotional responses).  These beliefs do not need to engage one's motivations (about 'what to do') in any way.

And the problem with that argument, is that such arguments are often not accessible to the theoretical reason of psychopaths, not because their is any deficiency in their reasoning but because of an emotional deficiency.  They can understand the logic and reasoning of your moral arguments just fine, yet they will not find the argument convincing, compelling, or even particularly sensible because they lack the emotions that are necessary to understand the assumptions and premises of the argument.

You don't even need to raise the specter of psychopaths to see that in practice.  The reason why people of different political beliefs or religions talk past one another because they are inadvertently building their arguments on unshared assumptions, many rational moral arguments will sail past the psychopath because they are build upon certain emotional assumptions, often the idea that certain things are important or should matter.

Quote from: AkrasiaThat's just what morality is according to the 'ideal observer' theory of moral sentiments – it gives you the necessary conditions for testing moral propositions.  And it certainly doesn't deny that some people might fail to be an 'ideal observer' in many ways (including the way in which psychopaths fail).

And that's fine, but it also doesn't explain why this particular theory is better than any other moral theory or even no theory at all.

Quote from: AkrasiaSure, I don't deny that some (perhaps even most) psychopaths can be happy and 'successful'.  But I'm not sure why the relative 'success' of psychopaths in living happy lives is relevant to the question of whether or not morality exists.

It's relevant to the question of whether certain concepts of morality work as advertised.

Quote from: AkrasiaThe concern that you describe is hardly a new one.  Worries about 'cunning knaves' and rational agents 'getting away with immoral actions' are hardly new (see Plato's discussion of the 'Ring of Gyges' in The Republic).  Yet moral theory hardly collapsed 2500 years ago.

Correct, but even those who believe in "cunning knaves" often don't believe that the cunning knave has no conscience at all.  This is what leads police officers to try to play on the conscience of serial killers, asking them to help bring closure to the families of their victims, even when they know they are horrible people.  Even then, they still imagine there is some conscience there that they can play on and fail because there isn't.

Quote from: AkrasiaThe fact that psychopaths lack a basic capacity for empathy is what their deficiency consists in – they lack a psychological feature that 96 percent of the population possesses, and that most people value (even if psychopaths don't).  Moreover, it's a feature that, were it not overwhelmingly dominant in the species, would very likely have led to our extinction some time ago (see, e.g., Brian Skyrm's Evolution of the Social Contract).

And if the world were all wolves and no rabbits, wolves would become extinct, too, but that doesn't mean that the wolf's survival strategy is bad.  That the whole species would have trouble surviving if it were psychopaths (I'm not sure that's true, but I'll accept it for the sake of argument) does not mean that being psychopath, when most of population isn't, is a bad deal any more than being a wolf is a bad deal in an area full of rabbits, nor does that mean it's better to be a rabbit than a wolf.

In other words, you are assuming that there is some intrinsic value to (A) being like everyone else and (B) ever member of a species being held to the same standard.  Neither of those is necessarily true.

Quote from: AkrasiaI'm not sure what you mean by this.  Do you have an example in mind?

What if your practical reason tells you that killing your neighbor is wrong but your theoretical reason tells you that there is nothing inherently bad about doing so?

Quote from: AkrasiaNow you're being either pointlessly uncharitable or irritatingly nit-picky.  (The 'hope' in any case refers to my 'hope' that my emotional structure works properly; I don't know whether it does right now, as I've never been subjected to the relevant tests.)

It was being a bit uncharitable but for a reason.  Several times in this thread, your responses seem to be driven by emotion rather than reason (including the point where you thought better of what you were writing and deleted it).  While you've admirably apologized and corrected yourself where necessary, I think it might be useful to consider the role that emotions are playing in your responses and opinions and why that is.  

Quote from: AkrasiaWhy is that 'all you'll say'?  You chastise me for not explaining things adequately, and then go on to make vague comments like this?  Why not just explain why you think that the paper refutes the arguments made on the web page?

Fair enough.  

The first response to the first aspect doesn't really deal with what I'm talking about (whether the motivation is internal to the fact or the fact simply recognizes it) since I'm not making Mackie's exactly claims.  The second response to the first aspect, "rather than positing that moral facts are necessarily motivating in their nature, they only tend to be so," is directly refuted by psychopaths.  Without motivation, the psychopath views moral facts as essentially aesthetic facts (the loss of distinction between "moral violations" and "conventional violations" violations described in that essay).

The third response to the first aspect claims, "That fact is that people are just as motivated by the acceptance of moral claims whether moral properties actually exist or not."  This also seems to be refuted by psychopaths.

The response second aspect could be problematic when considering psychopaths but I don't think it's part of my argument.  

The response to the third aspect says, "While we can easily know natural facts by straight forward observation, it is not at all clear what is happening when we look at something and are able to 'detect' moral properties through intuition."  The psychopath creates a further problem.  They don't "detect" moral properties through intuition at all.  As such, the entire concept becomes alien to them.  In other words, intuition may reflect mathematics but the mathematics don't cease to exist if we eliminate the intuition.  The psychopath suggests that if we eliminate the intuition for moral reasoning, then then morality itself disappears.  This suggests a much more direct and dependent relationship between intuition and moral thought than between intuition and mathematics.

In short, plug the psychopath into almost every one of those responses and they seem to contradict the claims being made.

Quote from: AkrasiaAnyhow, I read that psychopaths paper a while ago (and, admittedly, very quickly).  While I found it very interesting (it is a good paper), I don't recall anything in it that even addressed 'moral realism', let alone refuted it.  Perhaps I'm mistaken.  I'll look at it again when I have some time.

The paper specifically addresses moral rationalism.

Quote from: AkrasiaThere are a number of possible meta-ethical theories out there:

Fair enough.  I'll try to take a look at them and get back to you if I think I have anything intelligent to say about them or if I find any of them persuasive.

Quote from: AkrasiaOverall, I think that 2 and 4 are most plausible.  Neither one is a form of 'moral scepticism', and neither one is in any way adversely affected by your point concerning psychopaths.

I'm probably going to focus particularly on that point, then.